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Abstract. If God knew I were going to write this paper, was I able to refrain from writing 
it this morning? One possible response to this question is that God’s knowledge does 
not take place in time and therefore He does not properly fore-know. According to this 
response, God knows absolutely everything, it’s just that He knows everything outside 
of time. The so-called timeless solution was one of the influential responses to the 
foreknowledge problem in classical Christian Theology. This solution, however, seemed 
to lose support in the recent debate. For example, Pike claims that “the doctrine of 
God’s timelessness entered Christian Theology (only) because Platonic thought was 
stylish at the time” (Pike, 1970, 190) and Hasker (2001) catalogues this as one of the 
minor solutions to the problem. One possible source for this general attitude towards 
timelessness is the thought that the very idea of timelessness is incoherent. In this 
paper I argue that that the timeless solution to the foreknowledge problem is congenial 
with the supervaluationist theory of branching time and that this formal framework 
provides, in fact, a precise characterization of the timeless solution to the foreknowl-
edge problem. The views presented in this paper are in line with those of Kretzmann 
and Stump (1981), Leftow (1991) and De Florio and Frigerio (2015).
Keywords: divine foreknowledge; omniscience; timelessness; indeterminist time; su-
pervaluationism.
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1. The foreknowledge problem
Suppose Jones mowed his lawn last Saturday and God foreknew that.1 Then, 
at some point before Saturday, say on Thursday, God believes that Jones 
will mow his lawn on Saturday. Then Jones’ ability to refrain from mowing 
his lawn before Saturday, say on Friday, is either (a) the ability of making 
God having a false belief or (b) the ability to influence on someone’s past 
beliefs or (c) the ability to turn into non-existence someone who existed 
in the past. Neither of (a) to (c) describes a real ability of Jones’. Therefore 
either Jones does not have the ability to refrain from mowing his lawn on 
Saturday or God does not foreknow that Jones will mow his lawn on Satur-
day (see Pike (1965)). Consider the following abbreviations:
tn : A  →  A holds in time tn
[G]A →  God knows A
□A →  It is necessary that A
⊡A →  It is accidentally necessary that A
Then the argument can be made more explicit in the following way,2
1. t0 : [G](t2 : J) [Assumption]
2. ⊡(t0 : [G](t2 : J)) [From 1 by NP]
3. □(t0 : [G](t2 : J) ⊃ t2 : J) [Instance of EO]
4. ⊡(t2 : J)  [From 2, 3 by TN]
1 I would like to express my gratitude to the Classical Theism Project https://classicalthe-
ismproject.wordpress.com/ for a summer stipend in 2015. This paper also benefited from 
the discussion in the Cluster Group on Analytic Theology http://www.unav.edu/en/web/
facultad-de-filosofia-y-letras/analytic-theology held in the University of Navarra in 2015. 
Thanks finally to the project Non-Transitive Logics: A New Approach to Paradoxes, funded 
by the MINECO (Government of Spain) Grant nº: FFI2013-46451-P.
2 This argument corresponds to steps (1) to (6) of the argument in (Zagzebski 2011, sec. 1). 
The argument seems to go back to, at least, the American philosopher Jonathan Edwards 
(Prior 1967, 113–4).
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The inferences appealed to in the argument are the following,
NP tn : A ⊢ ⊡ (tn : A)  (for any n < p where tp is present time)
EO ⊢ □(tn :[G]A ⊃ A)  (for any n)
TN ⊡A, □(A ⊃ B) ⊢ ⊡B
NP expresses the “necessity of the past”: that anything that already oc-
curred is now accidentally necessary: it’s not necessary that Caesar crossed 
the Rubicon but once he did, there’s nothing we can do today to change 
that it happened. EO records the (tensed) essential omniscience of God: 
if God believes A (at any time n) then A. TN is the principle of transfer of 
necessity according to which if A is accidentally necessary and necessarily 
if A then B, it follows that B is also accidentally necessary.
The explanation of the argument is as follows. Suppose that we are 
talking in time t1, after time t0 but prior to time t2. Step 1 states that God 
knows in time t0 that in time t2 Jones mows his lawn. Since t0 is already past, 
it is now accidentally necessary that God knows in time t0 that in time t2 
Jones mows his lawn. Step 3 is an instance of EO. From that conditional in 
step 3 and the accidental necessity of its antecedent (step 2) it follows that 
it is today accidentally necessary that in t2 Jones mows his lawn (but if it is 
today accidentally necessary, then there’s nothing Jones, or even anyone 
of us, to change the fact that Jones mows his lawn in t2).
In this paper we will use a propositional language with simple tens-
es ‘⟨+⟩’ and ‘[+]’ informally meaning ‘at some time in the future’ and ‘at 
every time in the future’ respectively (‘⟨-⟩’ and ‘[-]’ will be used to talk 
about the past.) Although with this language we don’t have explicit refer-
ence to times, unlike the language in the argument above, we might still 
capture its essence in the simple-tense language. The semantics we will 
give to □ is simple: □A is true in time t just in case A is true everywhere;3 
 the reasons is that □ is supposed to be a form of analytic necessity (see 
(Pike 1965, 35)). The fundamental idea is the following interpretation of ⊡:
⊡A =df [+]⟨-⟩A
3 More specifically, given an interpretation ⟨𝒯, <, ⟦∙⟧⟩, □A is true in time t ∈ 𝒯 just in case A 
is true in every t ∈ 𝒯; see section 2 for the semantics.
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Since ⊡ means something like: it does not matter how the world evolves, 
it won’t be the case that it didn’t happen. Now this interpretation is not 
fully faithful to the idea of the necessity of the past in a, I want to argue, 
harmless way. The idea of the necessity of the past involves reference to 
a particular time: if A took place at time t in the past, then it will always be 
the case that A took place at time t. Under the definition above, if A is ac-
cidentally necessary, that guarantees that it will always be true that A was 
true but not necessarily at the same past time. This difference rests crucially 
in an expressive limitation of our simple modal language; the difference, 
however, is harmless in the sense that we can add some information to 
reach a similar effect to that of naming times.4 Suppose for example that 
I want to express that it is accidentally necessary that Jones mows his lawn 
(due to the fact that Jones is now doing that). Then I can write:
⊡J ∧ ¬⟨-⟩J
In this case, if ⊡J is true, that is due to something that is happening to-
day. We can see this strategy as a way to force J to make reference to the 
relevant fact (a fact that is happening today) without explicit naming of 
times. Given the above qualifications, the final shape of the argument is 
the following,
0. ¬⟨-⟩J ∧ ¬J 
1. [G]⟨+⟩J  [Assumption]
2. ⊡([G]⟨+⟩J) [From 1 by NP]
3. □([G]⟨+⟩J ⊃ 〈+⟩J)  [Instance of EO]
4. ⟨+⟩J [From 2, 3 by TN]
5. 𝕌⟨+⟩J  [From 0 and 4]
We added premise 0 for the reasons just given; in that way, we guarantee 
that if ⟨+⟩J is accidentally necessary, that is due to something that is hap-
4 Modal logics with explicit reference to times are known as hybrid logics. We avoid a hybrid 
language in order to keep technicalities to a minimum.
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pening in the immediate future (and not, for example, because J already 
occurred in the past). For the final line, ‘𝕌A’ means ‘A is unavoidable’. Steps 
1 to 4 are based on a rewriting of the principles above according to our 
previous remark about ⊡,
NP A ⊢ [+]⟨-⟩A 
EO ⊢ □([G]A ⊃ A) 
TN [+]⟨-⟩A, □(A ⊃ B) ⊢ [+]⟨-⟩B
2. Branching time and supervaluationism
In this section we present Prior-Thomason semantics for indeterminist 
time (in Thomason (1970)) for the simple modal language of the last argu-
ment.5 An interpretation for this language is a structure ⟨𝒯, <, ⟦∙⟧⟩ where,
𝒯 ≠ ∅
< is a tree order on 𝒯
⟦∙⟧ is a function: Var × 𝒯 → {1, 0}
A (strict) partial order < on 𝒯 is a relation between the elements of 𝒯 that is 
irreflexive and transitive. Such an order is a tree-order on 𝒯 if, in addition:
for any t, t* and t** if t*< t and t**< t then either t*< t** or t**<t*.
This last condition amounts to the idea that a tree-order is a partial order 
that is “linear to the left”. This idea, in turn, seems to capture the intuitive 
5 I discovered, after writing much of this paper, that De Florio and Frigerio (2015) also make 
use of the formal framework of Thomason to discuss the question of foreknowledge. 
Although we agree in the philosophical background, the discussions are quite different 
in, at least, two respects. We both add further structure to Thomason’s semantics, but 
they add a dynamic view of models that interact with a “NOW” operator whereas I intend 
just to see how to define a truth-predicate coherent with Thomason’s semantics. Second, 
the scope of the paper is different for, whereas theirs discuss a broader range of topics, 
this paper restricts the attention to the formalization of the foreknowledge problem.
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asymmetry between past and future: for any t ∈ 𝒯 there is a set ℋt of his-
tories containing t; these histories agree up to t and possibly disagree after 
t. (A history is a subset 𝒯*⊆ 𝒯 that is linearly ordered by <; this is some-
times called a maximal chain.) The tree-order, therefore, seems to rule out 
Ockhamist solutions.6
Figure 1. Tree-like structure
 
The function ⟦∙⟧ is a bivalent assignment of truth-values to propositional 
variables relative to each t ∈ 𝒯. Given that the same time t might belong to 
multiple histories, the truth-conditions for a formula A will be relative, not 
just to a given time t but also to a given history h such that t ∈ h:
⟦¬A⟧t
h = 1 just in case ⟦A⟧t
h = 0 
⟦A ∧ B⟧t
h =1 just in case ⟦A⟧t
h = ⟦B⟧t
h =1
⟦〈-〉A⟧t
h = 1 just in case ∃t* ∈ h such that t* < t and ⟦A⟧t*
h = 1
⟦〈+〉A⟧t
h = 1 just in case ∃t* ∈ h such that t < t* and ⟦A⟧t*
h = 1
This semantics works fine for either classical or ‘〈-〉’ operators but there is 
an issue with ‘〈+〉’ formulas. Given that a tree-order might be “non-linear 
to the right”, a formula ‘〈+〉A’ might receive different truth-values relative 
to different histories (see figure 2). Now if ‘⟨+⟩A’ is true in t relative to his-
tory h [t ∈ h] and false relative to h* [t ∈ h*], what is the final truth-value of 
6 See Saunders (1966), Adams (1967) and a number of replies in that journal. The choice of 
a tree-order comes with the underlying assumption that future indeterminacy should be 
accounted for in terms of “branching time”.
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‘⟨+⟩A’ in t? Thomason’s strategy (Thomason 1970, 272) is considering that, 
in such a case, the formula is neither true nor false.7
Figure 2. Open Future
 
A supervaluation is a partial valuation based on a set of complete valu-
ations. A time t determines a set ℋt of histories (the set of histories that 
pass over t). Each history h ∈ ℋt, in turn, provides a complete valuation for 
formulas of the language (including ‘⟨+⟩’ formulas) relative to time t. For 
this reason, the tree-like structure of time is a natural context to define 
a supervaluation:
A is supertrue at time t just in case for all h ∈ ℋt, ⟦A⟧t
h = 1.
In general, logical consequence is a matter of necessary preservation of 
truth. Since our relevant notion of truth is that of supertruth, logical con-
sequence is defined accordingly (the subscript PT is for Prior-Thomason 
tense logic):
Γ ⊨PT A just in case, there is no interpretation ⟨𝒯, <, ⟦∙⟧⟩ with t ∈ 𝒯 such that:
∀h ∈ ℋt ∀B ∈ Γ, ⟦B⟧t
h = 1 & ∃h ∈ ℋt ⟦A⟧t
h = 0
In words, an argument is valid just in case there is no interpretation and 
time t such that all premises are supertrue and the conclusion is not.
7 Alternatively, we could consider that it is both true and false. Subvaluationism, the dual 
theory of supervaluationism, has precisely this effect.
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3. Retrospective determinacy  
and a supervaluationist truth-predicate
A characteristic feature of supervaluationism generally speaking is that 
it makes compatible classical logic with truth-value gaps.8 In the case of 
Prior-Thomason’s temporal logic supervaluationism comes with some ad-
ditional validities,9 one of which is the following inference:
A ⊨PT [-]⟨+⟩A
For suppose A is true in actual time t. Then ⟨+⟩A is true in any time t* < t of 
any history h ∈ ℋt ; that is, ⟨+⟩A is supertrue at any such time t (relative 
to the set of histories ℋt).
The validity of this inference is connected with the so-called problem 
of retrospective determinacy (see Loss (2012)). According to the previous 
semantics, the utterance of a statement ⟨+⟩A might be neither true nor 
false at some time t. If, however, according to some later time t* A comes out 
true, we can “looking backwards” consistently say that the utterance of ⟨+⟩
A was true in t (this last is recorded in the validity of the inference above). 
Explaining how can this inference be valid in the presence of truth-value 
gaps involves a peculiar form of relativism: the same proposition (not just 
the same sentence) might be both neither true nor false and true at the 
same time relative to different circumstances of evaluation.10
Thomason takes this inference to show that the notion of supertruth 
is different from that of unavoidability. Thomason considers the following 
definition of unavoidability,
⟦𝕌A⟧t
h = 1 just in case ∀h*∈ ℋt ⟦𝕌A⟧t
h* = 1
8 In addition to Thomason’s paper van Fraassen (1966) and Fine (1975) are classical exam-
ples of the application of supervaluationism in different contexts. See Keefe (2000) for 
a more contemporary defence of supervaluationism. See Cobreros and Tranchini (2014) 
for recent discussion on this feature of supervaluationism. 
9 ⊨PT ⟨+⟩A ∨ ⟨+⟩¬A is a particularly nice example.
10 This point is convincingly vindicated by Loss (2012) in response to an objection of MacFar-
lane (2008). 
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And wonders whether this is not in fact an object language expression of 
the idea of supertruth (Thomason 1970, 278). As Thomason points out, 
under this definition truth seems to collapse with unavoidability since the 
definition of 𝕌 seems to mirror in the object language the definition above 
of supertruth. Furthermore, the following pair of inferences are valid:
• 𝕌A ⊨ A
• A ⊨PT 𝕌A
11
Thomason, however, argues that, despite initial appearances, truth and 
unavoidability (or inevitability, as he says) are different. He seeks to show 
this difference defining a new operator 𝕋 for truth:
⟦𝕋A⟧t
h = 1 just in case ⟦A⟧t
h = 1 (Thomason 1970, 278)
This is a transparent truth-predicate, allowing for full substitutivity be-
tween A and ‘𝕋A’. This means, among other things, that the inference,
A ⊨PT [-]⟨+⟩A
remains valid. The same, however, cannot be said of unavoidability since,
A ⊨/ [-]⟨+⟩A.
With this different logical behaviour, Thomason nicely puts the subtle dif-
ference between truth and unavoidability:
Our theory thus allows (indeed forces) us to say that having been true is dif-
ferent from having been inevitable, as far as future-tensed statements go. The 
latter is not a consequence of the former,
[-]𝕋⟨+⟩A ⊨/ PT [-]⟨+⟩A,
11 The inferences don’t entail the triviality of 𝕌 because of a failure of the deduction theo-
rem; in particular, A ⊃ 𝕌A.
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because in an assertion that it was true that a thing would come about, truth 
is relative to events up to the present, whereas in an assertion that it was in-
evitable that a thing would come about, inevitability is judged relative to some 
time in the past. (p. 279)
I think Thomason’s explanation about the difference between truth and 
unavoidability hits the nail on the head. I don’t think, however, Thoma-
son’s definition of ‘𝕋’ reflects the notion of truth working in the semantics, 
since supertruth allows for truth-value gaps but with the above definition 
we have, among other things, ⊨PT 𝕋A ∨ ¬𝕋A.
Thomason’s explanation of the difference between truth and unavoid-
ability contains the key to provide an object-language characterization of 
supertruth. The driving idea is the following. The evaluation, in a given 
time, of a sentence containing tense operators requires moving forwards 
or backwards along the time structure. If times are linearly ordered, there 
is a single relevant history and the “movement” in search of times for eval-
uation reduces always to that history. If time has a tree-like structure, the 
point at which we start the evaluation, what we might call the perspective, 
determines the histories relevant for the evaluation of the sentence. The 
sentence “Jones will mow his lawn” is neither true nor false on Friday, 
when Friday is the starting point of evaluation (when Friday is the per-
spective). The sentence “Jones will mow his lawn” is true on Friday, when 
Saturday is the perspective.
The idea can be expressed in a more formal style saying that, in tree-
like structures, the evaluation of tensed sentences involves a double refer-
ence to time.12 One of the reference times is the time at which we evaluate 
a given sentence (what we will call the evaluation time), the second refer-
ence time is the perspective.
In the previous semantics, we made explicit reference to the evaluation 
time, but we didn’t do the same with the perspective. The reason, I think, is 
12 This idea appears also in Loss (2012). The double-time-reference is explicitly endorsed 
and defended in Belnap and Green (1994) and Perloff and Belnap (2011). These authors, 
however, reject the supervaluationist treatment of future contingent statements. 
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that we tend to take for granted that the perspective, the time at which the 
evaluation process begins, is identical with the time at which the sentence 
under evaluation is uttered, the time of assertion (see Perloff and Belnap 
(2011)). This makes perfect sense. As temporal beings, our actions, and 
particularly speech acts like assertions, take place in a particular time and 
are therefore connected to a particular perspective. It is not unthinkable, 
however, that perspective and time of assertion be different, as we shall 
point out later.
Given the previous remarks, we redefine the truth predicate as relative 
to a perspective and also redefine unavoidability accordingly.
⟦𝕋A⟧t
h [p] = 1 just in case case ∀h
*∈ ℋp ⟦A⟧t
h*
[p] = 1
⟦𝕌A⟧t
h [p] = 1 just in case case ∀h
*∈ ℋt ⟦A⟧t
h*
[t] = 1
The intended meaning of this truth operator is the following: a sentence 
A is true, relative to a given perspective p, just in case A is “settled” accord-
ing to that perspective (true for all histories that pass over the perspective). 
Following our example, the statement ‘It is true that Jones will mow his 
lawn’ is false from Friday’s perspective but true from Saturday’s perspec-
tive. The definition of unavoidability intends to register the fact that, un-
like truth, this notion is relative to the time of evaluation (as Thomason 
points out ‘inevitability is judged relative to some time in the past.’) and 
hence the predicate takes into account all histories from the time of eval-
uation on. 𝕋 and 𝕌 are certainly similar in that both are defined relative to 
a set of histories, but might differ in exactly what set. That set is guaran-
teed to be the same when time of evaluation and perspective coincide but 
not otherwise.
We end up this section with a small remark about logical consequence 
and its relation to time. Logical consequence can be characterized as con-
straining what we are in a position to deny given what we assert. If, for 
example, I assert A ∧ B, I’m not in a position to deny A. In the context of 
tensed sentences and, furthermore, assuming that truth is relative to a per-
spective, we should make explicit the role of time. Logical consequence 
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constraints what we are in a position to deny in time t given what we assert 
in t. If, for example, I presently assert A ∧ B, I’m not presently in a position 
to deny A. For this reason we set the same time for the initial time of eval-
uation and perspective in the definition of logical consequence:
Γ ⊨ A just in case, there is no interpretation ⟨𝒯, <, ⟦∙⟧⟩ with t∈ 𝒯 such that:
∀h ∈ ℋt ∀B ∈ Γ, ⟦B⟧t
h
[t] = 1 & ∃h∈ℋt ⟦A⟧t
h
[t] = 0
Given the previous definitions, here are some interestingly valid and inva-
lid inferences involving 𝕋 and 𝕌:
• 𝕌A ⊨ 𝕋A & 𝕋A ⊨ 𝕌A
• A ⊨ [-]𝕋⟨+⟩A 
• A ⊨/ [-]𝕌⟨+⟩A
• A ⊨/ [-]𝕌𝕋⟨+⟩A
4. The timeless solution to the foreknowledge problem
According to some classical authors like Anselm, Boethius and Aquinas, 
God’s eternality should be understood as God’s existing “outside time” 
so that we cannot attribute temporal properties to God. In this sense, the 
problem of foreknowledge seems to disappear: it cannot be properly said 
that God foreknows anything. So in the argument above, the assumption 
in line 1, that God knows that Jones will mow his lawn, seems illegitimate. 
Things, however, are not so easy. Since for these authors, like for many 
theistic positions, God communicates with creatures and from time to time 
makes infallible predictions (prophecies). Furthermore, in the classical 
view, God’s omniscience is not restricted by the openness of the future, 
rather, God knows all things, past, present and future, in a simultaneous 
present (Kretzmann and Stump 1981, 434). So God knows whether Jones 
will mow his lawn and the question raises again, how can the timeless view 
address the argument?
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Note that given the supervaluationist semantics for branching time, 
the argument is valid. The principle of necessity of the past is valid, so that 
proposition (1): ‘God knows J’, entails proposition (2): ‘it will always be 
true that God knew J’. Our interpretation of as □ true everywhere is strong 
enough to guarantee the validity of transfer of necessity, since the truth of 
[+]⟨-⟩A and the falsity of [+]⟨-⟩B at the same time t require some time t* 
where A is true and B false, contrary to the truth of □(A ⊃ B).13 The final 
step, from 0 and 4 to 5 is, once again, valid.14 Informally, if J is not true 
today, nor in any past time (assumption 0: ¬⟨-⟩J ∧ ¬J), then that [+]⟨-⟩⟨+⟩J 
is supertrue means that all future histories contain one immediately suc-
ceeding time where J, in which case 𝕌⟨+⟩J, it is unavoidable that Jones will 
mow his lawn.
In our definition of logical consequence above we assumed that the 
perspective coincides with the time of assertion, but what happens when 
this is not the case? Consider the case of a time traveller. A crucial incident 
in the plot of Back to the Future II is the travel to the past of the Sports 
Almanac containing all the results in a number of competitions from 1950 
to 2000. When old Tannen gives the Sports Almanac to young Tannen in 
1954, he asserts ‘UCLA will win 19–17’. Is this assertion true? Well, it’s true 
from old Tannen perspective but at this point the perspective and the time 
of assertion are different. When this happens, truth might fail to be factive 
in the sense that the following inference is invalid,
𝕋A ⊨/ A
13 Here is a more detailed explanation. Suppose there is some time t at which [+]⟨-⟩A and 
that □(A ⊃ B) are supertrue but [+]⟨-⟩B is superfalse. According to the last, for any history 
h ∈ ℋt there is some time t < t
* such that ⟨-⟩B is false in t*; this last in turn means that B is 
false at all times prior to t*. Call h* to any such history. Since [+]⟨-⟩A is supertrue at t, it is 
true, in particular, relative to history h*. Therefore, at time t* ⟨-⟩A is true and this requires 
a time t** < t* such that A is true in t**. But by what we said above B is false at t** and, there-
fore, the conditional A ⊃ B is also false at t**, contrary to the assumption that □(A ⊃ B).
14 The validity of this step rests on Thomason’s supervaluationist version of Prior’s logic; 
that inference might not be valid without the assumption that the property preserved by 
logical consequence is supertruth.
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Under old Tannen’s perspective, it is true that UCLA will win 19–17, 
but this does not entail that it is a fact (that it is true taking that point in 
1954 as the perspective).
According to the timeless solution, God does not share our perspec-
tive of time. My thesis is, therefore, that the timeless solution to the fore-
knowledge problem should be understood along these lines: when God 
asserts something (or better: when we claim God is in a position to assert 
something), the perspective and the time of assertion do not coincide. In 
this situation, the truth predicate above is no longer factive. Taking the 
argument once again, that God knows that Jones will mow his lawn entails 
that it is true that Jones will mow his lawn, but this, in turn, does not entail 
that Jones will mow his lawn.
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